Is the Multipolar World Already Here?

Geostrategists have been debating for some time how long U.S. world hegemony will last and what will replace it. For example, Zbigniew Brezinski foresees a generation-long soft landing in which the U.S. will gradually transition its dominating role to a group of powers.

But as I previewed in January, Parag Khanna of the New America Foundation argues that this transition has already occurred - that we are living in a world dominated by three main power centers, the U.S., Europe, and China. In his recently published book The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, Khanna expands on his thesis. In his view, both Europe and China are working off independent agendas, building influence over many countries, and that the U.S. is no longer in any position to control much of the world's agenda. Though its military is still without peer, its spiraling indebtedness, ignorance of the rest of the world, stark inequality, and political paralysis are making the U.S. less and less able to sustain its advantages.

Does it matter to the world's people whether there is one dominant power or several? One reason Khanna thinks it does is that, in the words of one reviewer, "the empires use their power in very different ways. The U.S. works on a 'coalition' model, building alliances on an issue-by-issue basis — counterterrorism, democratization, economic liberalization. The E.U. employs a 'consensus' model, slowly working toward agreement on domestic issues, then using its huge market and attractive economic and social policies to draw countries into its orbit. And China uses a 'consultative' model, depending on other nations’ belief that doing business with China is advantageous economically and politically, and that it is necessary to put off other, more controversial issues involving labor rights, the environment, and governmental transparency."

In other words, a nation in the European or Chinese orbit will have a very different experience than one in the U.S. orbit. The mixed economies and the equal relationships between member countries of the EU, and the economic development programs and trade opportunities found in the Chinese sphere, contrast with the free market fundamentalism and plain neglect brought by the U.S. to countries under its wing. In an article published yesterday in Dawn, Khanna also pointed out that the EU's model of regional economic integration is being widely emulated, and he elsewhere points out that China's emergence marks the first time in the modern era that a non-Western power has done so. However, Khanna's arguments on all these points are sketchy. Since his account is essentially political, lacking any real analysis of exploitation or imperialism, the long term development of the countries within the three spheres of influence remains for others to address.

A second reason it matters is that the next tier of partially developed, partially poor nations - the "second world" - are increasingly able to play the major powers against each other, maneuvering for advantage as the hegemons seek allies and markets. Most of the book is devoted to a whirldwind tour of dozens of countries. These chapters are fun, informal, and useful, providing updates from many places we don't read much about, drawing comparisons and contrasts, and commenting in particular on the impact of the three major powers on each country. Europe and China are both extending their power geographically - the EU in East Europe and Northern Africa, China in East and Southeast Asia, and the two contending in the Middle East and in ex-Soviet Central Asia. Since the U.S., on the other hand, is still trying to dominate the whole world, it is spread too thin to achieve much and is even neglecting its own geographical backyard, Latin America.

Khanna is scathing about America's problems. "Empires collapse not long after they reach their fullest extent," and he says the U.S. may very well fall to second world status if it does not pull itself together and combat the inequality, collapse of public services, fear of the future and political dysfunction which are eating away at its sense of cohesion.

Khanna is vague about timelines. Are we really talking about three superpowers that are working independently and at cross purposes now? Is there danger that the struggle of three powers will lead to the next world war? Many times Khanna refers to "the West", acknowledging that the U.S. and EU still often operate as a unit, and it does not seem that this is out of a temporary tactical alliance but rather is based on fundamental shared goals. As for China, Khanna says that he does not expect it to move its main attention beyond the Asian region for decades. Khanna concludes by calling on the three powers to form a G-3, a managed equilibrium that replaces the current Western-dominated "international community" with a new division of labor.

I find much that rings true in this view. The U.S. is no longer operating as an effective hegemon as it has done for the last 60 years, but seems to be blocked at every turn. When Venezuela proceeds to build a Bolivarian socialist and pan-Latin-American project for eight years with little effective interference from El Norte, when Israel loses a fight with Hezbollah and signs a ceasefire with Hamas, and when Pakistan- yes, Pakistan!- publicly defies the U.S. over military policy and gets away with it - then this is no longer the U.S. imperialist world system we have long been accustomed to. This is a world in major transition.